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STATE  STANDING  AND  NATIONAL  INJUNCTIONS
Bradford Mank* & Michael E. Solimine**
INTRODUCTION
Two controversies currently roiling the federal courts and federal courts
scholarship are whether and to what extent states have standing as plaintiffs
in federal court, and when, if ever, federal courts can issue national or
nationwide injunctions1 against the federal government, even when only one
or a small number of states or other parties have brought suit.  While federal
courts have long permitted states to bring suit by virtue of their status as
sovereigns, states have more aggressively brought such suits in the wake of
the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,2 which relaxed the
standing requirements for states.  Similarly, while for several decades some
federal courts have issued injunctions binding the entire nation—beyond the
scope of their particular geographic jurisdictions—it is only in the last few
years that such injunctions have become a trend.  Courts, commentators, and
Congress are now weighing in on that trend.3
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1 We use the terms “national” or “nationwide” injunction throughout this Essay, as
does most of the literature. E.g., Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National
Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 & n.5 (2017); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide
Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1070–71 (2018). But see Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct.
2392, 2425 & n.1 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (preferring to use “universal” injunc-
tions); Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and
They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 349–52 (2018) (same).  Nothing
in this Essay turns on which term is more appropriate.
2 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3 For examples of courts weighing in, see infra Section III.A; see also Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. at 2424–29 (Thomas, J., concurring) (criticizing issuance of universal injunc-
tions).  For commentators, see, for example, Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges
Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws Nationwide, ATLANTIC (Oct. 31, 2018),
www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/574471; supra
note 1.  For Congress, bills have been introduced to address the issue. E.g., Injunctive
Authority Clarification Act, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong. (2018) (proposing to place limits on
the effect of injunctions on nonparties); Assigning Proper Placement of Executive Action
1955
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Both issues can arise in the same litigation, such as in Texas v. United
States, where the Fifth Circuit struck down the Obama administration’s
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents
(“DAPA”) program granting lawful immigration status to potentially millions
of undocumented immigrants.4  The court there held that at least one of the
twenty-six plaintiff States had standing, and that a nationwide injunction
against enforcement of DAPA was appropriate.5  But the convergence of the
issues was almost coincidental, as the court did not discuss both the propriety
of state standing and of a national injunction in any systematic way.  Much
the same can be said about the scholarly literature on these topics.  Thus,
most of the growing literature on national injunctions makes only passing
mention, if at all, of states being plaintiffs or of the appropriateness of state
standing and how it might bear on the geographic scope of an injunction.6
This Essay undertakes to fill that gap in a more extended way.  Part I of
the Essay addresses the issue of state standing in suits against the federal gov-
ernment, and argues that such standing is well grounded in the traditional
parens patriae powers of states and should be permitted to protect the health,
welfare, and natural resources of their citizens.  That is, courts should permit
states to have standing under somewhat relaxed criteria as compared to what
private plaintiffs must show.  Part II turns to national injunctions; discusses
the recent increases in the issuance of those decrees; and explores the con-
troversy over when, if ever, federal courts possess powers under equity or
standing criteria to bind the entire nation.
Part III addresses both topics in a coordinated manner.  It acknowledges
the benefit of states suing to protect federalism interests against the incur-
sions of the federal government, but also addresses the pathologies of one or
more states bringing suit, particularly in the partisanship demonstrated by
states led by attorneys general or governors of states from the same political
Lawsuits Act, H.R. 2660, 115th Cong. (2017) (proposing to give federal district courts in
the District of Columbia exclusive jurisdiction in all suits challenging executive orders,
actions, or memoranda).
4 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 151–62 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an
equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
5 Id. at 155, 187–88.  In the literature and in this Essay, there is some ambiguity on
what counts as a “state” involved in a court suit.  In the Texas v. United States litigation, for
example, of the twenty-six States involved, twenty-two were represented by state attorneys
general and four were represented by governors.  Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d
591, 604 n.1 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016); see also infra note 77 (further discussing distinctions of
what counts as a state in this context).
6 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 1, at 470 & n.307; Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, One Good Plain-
tiff Is Not Enough, 67 DUKE L.J. 481, 512–13 (2017); Frost, supra note 1, at 1091–93; Paul
Nolette, The Dual Role of State Attorneys General in American Federalism: Conflict and Cooperation
in an Era of Partisan Polarization, 47 PUBLIUS 342, 344–45 (2017).  Exceptions to the general-
ization we make in the text include Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law
Litigation in an Age of Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 71–72, 111–13 (2018), and Jonathan
Remy Nash, State Standing for Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government, 94 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1985 (2019).
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party suing to stop the actions of a presidential administration of a different
party.  While states in some circumstances have standing to sue, it does not
automatically follow that even when successful the entire nation should be
subject to an injunction.  Rather, we propose an alternative to the dichotomy
that courts always (or almost always) or, conversely, never have authority to
issue such injunctions.  We support the possibility of nationwide injunctions,
but before issuing such decrees, courts should take into account factors such
as the number and geographic and partisan diversity of the states, who (attor-
ney general or governor) is representing a state, and which one or more
states are opposing the decrees, as parties or amici curiae.  These criteria
would better inform and integrate judicial consideration of state standing
and national injunctions when they arise in the same case.  Finally, Part III
critically examines various possible statutory solutions to the problems of
national injunctions, including vesting exclusive jurisdiction of suits seeking
that relief in the District of Columbia, or requiring that they be heard by a
three-judge district court.
I. STATE STANDING
States have long been permitted to sue in federal court in various capaci-
ties, such as in their own proprietary capacity, little different from that of
private parties.7  But it is fair to say that “[t]he most difficult standing cases”
are those where a state sues in its parens patriae capacity, relying on its quasi-
sovereign interests of representing its citizens generally.8  Most relevant to
this Essay, the difficulties are particularly present in cases where states sue the
federal government.  Those cases “seem to depend in part upon the kind of
claim that the state advances, but they are hard to reconcile.”9
For our purposes, the most pertinent decision is Massachusetts v. EPA,10
where the Supreme Court in 2007 declared that states are entitled to “special
solicitude” for standing in Article III federal courts.11  Additionally, the
Court stated that, in at least some circumstances, states enjoy greater Article
III standing rights than private individuals.12  Justice Stevens in his majority
opinion wrote: “We stress here, as did Judge Tatel below, the special position
and interest of Massachusetts.  It is of considerable relevance that the party
seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it was in Lujan [v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife], a private individual.”13
But the Massachusetts decision failed to articulate a clear rationale for
why states are entitled to greater Article III standing rights than private indi-
viduals.  The Court confusingly relied upon both Massachusetts’s procedural
7 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 279 (7th ed. 2015).
8 Id.
9 Id. at 283.
10 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
11 Id. at 520.
12 Id. at 518.
13 Id. (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)).
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rights under the Clean Air Act and its quasi-sovereign interests.14  In his dis-
senting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts correctly pointed out that in the Clean
Air Act “Congress treated public and private litigants exactly the same.”15
Accordingly, the Clean Air Act might possibly provide a basis for state stand-
ing, but not for greater state standing rights than private parties.16
In the Massachusetts decision, the only plausible theory for why states
might possess greater standing rights than private individuals is because of
their quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health and welfare of their
citizens and the states’ natural resources.17  In his dissent, however, Roberts
argued that Massachusetts’s quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health
and welfare of its citizens and the State’s natural resources could not serve as
a basis for a suit against the federal government.  This is because the Court’s
1923 decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon18 held that states may not ground a
suit against the federal government on quasi-sovereign interests, since the
federal government rather than the state is in charge of protecting such
interests.19  For the majority, Stevens attempted to distinguish the Mellon
decision by arguing that that case merely prevented states from invoking
quasi-sovereign interests to block federal regulation of its citizens rather than
14 Id. at 518–20.  For further discussion of the unclarity of the decision, see FALLON ET
AL., supra note 7, at 285–86; Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1701, 1733–34, 1746–47, 1786 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, Should States Have Greater Stand-
ing] (arguing that the Massachusetts decision did not clearly articulate its basis for giving
greater standing rights to states or to what extent state standing rights are greater); Brad-
ford C. Mank, State Standing in United States v. Texas: Opening the Floodgates to States Chal-
lenging the Federal Government, or Proper Federalism?, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 211, 218 [hereinafter
Mank, State Standing in United States v. Texas] (“Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Mas-
sachusetts confusingly combined the parens patriae or quasi-sovereign rationale for state
standing with other theories for recognizing standing, such as the argument that Congress
conferred in the CAA [Clean Air Act] a procedural right for states to challenge certain
EPA decisions.”).
15 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 537 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
16 See id. at 536–37.  The different positions of the majority and dissent in Massachusetts
v. EPA can be viewed as an example of different models of decisionmaking by federal
courts.  The dispute-resolution model assumes a restrained role for federal court litigation,
in that it is primarily meant to resolve concrete disputes between actual parties to the
litigation, while giving a wide berth to the politically accountable branches of government
to resolve policy disputes.  In contrast, the law-declaration model assumes that federal
courts can and should take into account public values and the broader impact of decisions.
FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 73–76. Massachusetts is best described as an example of the
latter model, since the State’s parens patriae standing does not depend on “doctrines gov-
erning the standing of private parties,” but rather “can be viewed as assertions by the state
of generalized grievances of its citizens.” Id. at 283.
17 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–20; Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing, supra
note 14, at 1727–29, 1756–59 (discussing state standing upon a quasi-sovereign theory of
standing).
18 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
19 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 539 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing Massachusetts v.
Mellon).
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“allowing a State to assert its rights under federal law,” which Massachusetts
was doing in relying upon the Clean Air Act to protect its citizens.20
Massachusetts has provoked continuing controversy due to its unclear
position on state standing.21  For example, because the decision’s attempt to
distinguish the Mellon decision was problematic, Professors F. Andrew Hes-
sick and William Marshall argue that the “special solicitude” for state stand-
ing in the Massachusetts decision was not based upon parens patriae standing
arising from a state’s quasi-sovereign interests in protecting the health and
welfare of its citizens and the state’s natural resources, but rather from the
Commonwealth’s interest in protecting its coastal areas from future erosion,
even though Roberts’s dissenting opinion argued that Massachusetts’s injury
was too speculative.22  They are correct in asserting that the Massachusetts
decision relied in part upon the alleged injury that Massachusetts was and
will be suffering from rising sea levels arguably caused by climate change in
finding a standing injury under Article III of the Constitution.23  However,
Hessick and Marshall fail to acknowledge that the Massachusetts decision
asserts multiple grounds for standing that begin with Massachusetts’s injury
from rising sea levels and build upon that injury to arguably open the door to
parens patriae standing.24
In another example, one of us has argued that the Massachusetts decision
potentially opened the door to a broad theory of parens patriae standing that
would allow states great latitude in suing the federal government, while
acknowledging the confusing and sometimes contradictory analysis in that
20 Id. at 520 n.17 (majority opinion).
21 FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 285–86 (discussing criticisms); Jonathan Remy Nash,
Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203–06 (2017) (arguing that
state standing doctrine is often “muddled”); Note, An Abdication Approach to State Standing,
132 HARV. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (2019) (referring to the “murkiness” of questions raised by
the decision).
22 F. Andrew Hessick & William P. Marshall, Essay, State Standing to Constrain the Presi-
dent, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 83, 107 (2018).  Hessick and Marshall reference Roberts’s argument
that the reputed injury to Massachusetts was too speculative to provide standing. Id. at 107
& n.143 (citing Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)).
23 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 522–23.
24 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.  Professor Jonathan Nash argues that the
“actual basis” of standing in Massachusetts may have been economic injury from rising sea
levels, but that the Court’s “murky” analysis purported to rest standing on the special role
of state sovereigns.  Nash, supra note 21, at 203–06.  He argues that a better approach than
the Massachusetts decision’s standing analysis would be “sovereign preemption state stand-
ing, under which a state would enjoy Article III standing to sue the federal government
when (1) the federal government preempts state law in an area, yet (2) the Executive
Branch allegedly underenforces the federal law that Congress enacted to address that very
same area.” Id. at 201.  For a similar approach, see Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue
the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 851, 880–95 (2016).  It is not clear whether the
Supreme Court will move away from looking at economic injuries to states in deciding state
standing.
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decision.25  The Massachusetts decision’s discussion of the Court’s 1907 deci-
sion in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.26 arguably opens the door to very broad
parens patriae standing.  The Tennessee Copper decision allowed states broad
authority to sue at least private parties that cause injuries to a state’s quasi-
sovereign interests in protecting the health and welfare of its citizens and the
state’s natural resources, and the Massachusetts decision did not appear troub-
led about applying the Tennessee Copper decision to a suit against the federal
government.27
Likewise, one of us has agreed with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United
States v. Texas28 granting states broad standing rights against the federal gov-
ernment based upon the Massachusetts decision and federalism concerns, but
also accepted the Fifth Circuit’s concern that there must be some limitations
on such standing rights so that states could not sue when the federal govern-
ment’s possible injury to a state or its citizens is comparably small.29  The
Fifth Circuit in the Texas decision concluded that Texas had standing to chal-
lenge the Obama administration’s DAPA program granting lawful immigra-
tion status to potentially millions of undocumented immigrants because
thousands of potential DAPA recipients in Texas would then be eligible to
receive driver’s licenses that are heavily subsidized by Texas, and, therefore,
the State would suffer an economic injury from DAPA’s economic impacts on
the State’s driver’s license program.30  But the Fifth Circuit’s decision spent
far less time discussing the subject of nationwide injunctions and was far less
convincing in concluding that Texas’s standing to challenge DAPA was the
grounds for a nationwide injunction against DAPA as opposed to an injunc-
tion in favor of only Texas.31
Another recent high-profile example of controversies over state standing
was the challenge to travel restrictions on citizens of several predominantly
Muslim countries issued by the Trump administration.32  Hawaii argued that
those restrictions impinged on the ability of its state universities to attract
students and faculty from affected countries.33  The Ninth Circuit agreed
with Hawaii’s argument in concluding that Hawaii’s “efforts to enroll stu-
dents and hire faculty members who are nationals from the six designated
countries fall within the zone of interests of the [Immigration and National-
25 Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing, supra note 14, at 1733–34, 1746–47,
1756–86.
26 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
27 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518–20; Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing, supra
note 14, at 1733–34, 1746–47, 1756–86.
28 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally
divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
29 Mank, State Standing in United States v. Texas, supra note 14, at 214, 227, 230–33.
30 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 151–62.
31 Id. at 187–88; see infra Section III.C.
32 For details on this litigation, see Frost, supra note 1, at 1072–73; Wasserman, supra
note 1, at 341–43.
33 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), rev’d, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018).
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ity Act].”34  But the Ninth Circuit’s opinion failed to document the extent of
the alleged injury to state universities.  Upon review, the Supreme Court
instead rested its finding of Article III standing upon the harm to three indi-
vidual plaintiffs from the inability of their relatives in affected countries to
obtain entrance to the United States, as opposed to Hawaii’s weakly articu-
lated claims of injuries to its state universities.35
Whether state standing exists is highly dependent upon the facts articu-
lated, and that in turn is true of whether courts should grant nationwide or
narrower injunctions.  Courts may impact suits by states depending upon
how they define and apply theories of state standing.  A further means to
appropriately limit state standing rights to reasonable boundaries lies in
deciding when state suits seeking nationwide injunctions are appropriate.
II. NATIONAL INJUNCTIONS
Having addressed and, within limits, approved of the standing of states
to bring suit in federal court challenging federal action, we now turn to an
overview of the relatively recent increased use of national injunctions in fed-
eral court.  We will link the topics in Part III of this Essay.
A. Overview of National Injunctions
As documented well by Professor Samuel Bray, federal judges issuing
national injunctions in suits against the federal government were virtually
unknown until relatively recently.36  Injunctions against the government
would typically be limited to the specific government dealing with the partic-
ular plaintiffs who had brought the suit.  This limitation usually had the
effect of limiting the geographical scope of the injunction to the boundaries
of the district court or of the court of appeals that issued or reviewed the
injunction.37  That changed starting in the 1960s, as courts began issuing
nationwide injunctions beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the particular
court.38  As Bray points out, there was “no major case,” and the shift was
“gradual and unplanned.”39  What accounts for the change?  Bray traces the
increasing judicial hospitality toward such injunctions to a number of factors,
including the passage of statutes in the twentieth century that concentrate
judicial review of a particular federal activity in one court, greater use of
rulemaking by federal agencies and judicial receptivity to suits seeking preen-
34 Id. (quoting Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 766 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam)).
35 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2416.  A stronger case of harm to state universities
was made in the separate Ninth Circuit case of Washington v. Trump, but that case was not
reviewed by the Supreme Court.  Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158–61 (9th Cir.
2017) (per curiam); infra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
36 Bray, supra note 1, at 424–37 (discussing federal court decisions up until 1960).
37 Id. at 428–29.
38 Id. at 437–52 (discussing cases from the 1960s to the present that issued such
injunctions).
39 Id. at 428, 456.
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forcement review of that rulemaking, and increased judicial confidence in
issuing such injunctions in the wake of civil rights litigation in the 1950s and
beyond.40
While national injunctions were thus not unknown until recent years, it
is fair to say that they have been more frequently requested from, and consid-
ered and issued by, federal courts during the Obama and Trump administra-
tions and are enjoying a higher level of attention than ever before.  In
litigation during both administrations, at least some judges have began to
treat them as “an ordinary part of the remedial arsenal of the federal
courts,”41 and there almost seems to be a presumption in favor of the
national injunction.  The record of litigation in recent years supports that
conclusion.  Consider, during both the Obama and Trump administrations,
the suits against and the national injunctions issued concerning the DAPA
program, the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), and the trans-
gender bathroom policy.42
One prominent example from that era was the litigation concerning
DAPA.  There, as we discussed in Part I, twenty-six States filed suit in federal
court in Texas, arguing that the DAPA directive violated the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), the federal immigration laws, and the Take Care
Clause of Article II of the Constitution.  After holding that Texas, at least,
had standing and that DAPA violated the APA, the district court issued an
injunction, though it didn’t specifically address its geographic scope.43  The
Fifth Circuit affirmed, and devoted a few short paragraphs to the national
injunction.44  The court stressed the ostensible need for nationwide uniform-
ity in the application of immigration laws, argued that “there is a substantial
likelihood that a geographically-limited injunction would be ineffective,” and
brusquely concluded that it is “not beyond the power of a [district] court, in
appropriate circumstances, to issue a nationwide injunction.”45
A similar pattern of litigation took place during the Trump administra-
tion.  Many of the initiatives on immigration were subject to suits that
culminated in a nationwide injunction, including the “travel ban” regarding
predominantly Muslim countries, the withholding of federal funds from
sanctuary cities, and the rescission of DACA.46  There, too, courts had little
trouble concluding that a nationwide injunction was appropriate.  Consider
40 Id. at 452–56.
41 Id. at 428.
42 For details on this litigation, see Frost, supra note 1, at 1076–79.
43 Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591 (S.D. Tex.), aff’d, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
44 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 187–88.
45 Id. at 188.  The parties did not expressly mention the nationwide injunction issue in
their briefing in the Supreme Court. See Brief for the Petitioners, United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674); Brief for the State Respondents, United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674).  The Supreme Court affirmed by an equally
divided vote and thus did not reach the issue. See United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271.
46 For details on this litigation, see Frost, supra note 1, at 1072–79; Wasserman, supra
note 1, at 340–48.
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as one example the litigation that attacked the rescission of DACA.  In
affirming the district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction, the Ninth
Circuit spent about a page and a half on the topic.47  The court invoked
familiar principles of equity that an injunction may affect nonparties to a suit,
cited the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States in stressing the need for uni-
formity in immigration matters, and chastised the government for failing “to
explain how the district court could have crafted a narrower injunction that
would provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”48
We don’t want to suggest that the late Obama administration and the
early Trump administration were the subject of nothing but an avalanche of
nationwide injunctions, especially in immigration disputes.  For example, the
district court in New York v. U.S. Department of Justice49 considered a challenge
by six States to the Trump administration threatening to cut off federal funds
to self-described “sanctuary cities,” which had refused to cooperate with the
administration’s enforcement of immigration laws.  The court held for the
plaintiffs on the merits, but limited the injunction to “the parties before the
Court and their political subdivisions.”50  Acknowledging the potentially
broad scope of equitable relief, the court nonetheless held that the
“[p]laintiffs have not made a sufficient showing of ‘nationwide impact’ dem-
onstrating that a nationwide injunction is necessary to completely accord
relief to them.”51  This decision, too, did not extensively discuss the issue,
and relied in part on the paucity of other federal courts’ decisions issuing
nationwide injunctions in similar litigation around the country.52
47 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 511–12 (9th
Cir. 2018).
48 Id. at 512; see also E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 909 F.3d 1219, 1255–56 (9th
Cir. 2018) (upholding national injunction against new limits on asylum applications by
Trump administration, stressing need for uniformity, and citing the Texas and Regents deci-
sions, but recognizing “a growing uncertainty about the propriety of [such injunctions],”
citing Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, and Bray, supra note 1).
More recent Ninth Circuit decisions have backed away from a near embrace of a seeming
rebuttable presumption in favor of national injunctions.  For example, in California v. Azar,
911 F.3d 558 (9th Cir. 2018), the court, in reversing the district court’s grant of a national
injunction, stated that national injunctions are permissible, but due to their potentially
detrimental effects, including forum shopping, held that the injunction should only apply
to the plaintiff states. Id. at 582–84 (citing Bray, supra note 1).
49 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal filed, No. 19-275 (2d Cir. Jan. 28, 2019).
50 Id. at 245.
51 Id. (quoting City and County of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2018)).
52 Id.  The court here relied on a Ninth Circuit decision in parallel litigation that had
declined to order a national injunction, in part due to an insufficient record on the need
for nationwide relief. Id. (citing San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d at 1244).
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B. Competing Evaluations and Reforms of the Nationwide Injunction
While many federal court decisions have not extensively discussed the
propriety, or lack thereof, of nationwide injunctions,53 scholars have filled
the gap.  Critics of the nationwide injunction have raised both constitutional
and prudential concerns.
The constitutional challenge is premised on the standing requirements
of Article III of the Constitution.  A plaintiff can only sue in federal court if
she demonstrates a concrete and particularized injury and the actual or
threatened enforcement of a law.  A generalized grievance or a putative
threat to the larger community will not itself confer standing on a particular
plaintiff.  It follows from these premises, so the argument runs, that a court
cannot properly award relief to persons not parties to the suit, i.e., those who
have not shown that they meet the standing requirements.54
Critics have also advanced prudential arguments, drawing on the tradi-
tional flexibility of equitable principles that underlie any injunction.  One
flaw, they argue, is that nationwide injunctions encourage forum shopping,
since plaintiffs do not need to successfully sue in multiple fora.55  This is
nicely illustrated by some of the aforementioned litigation.  In Texas v. United
States, twenty-six Republican-oriented States (we refer to the political affilia-
tion of the state attorney general or governor representing the state) sued in
a federal district court in Texas, several of whose judges had already entered
injunctions in cases brought by states against Obama-administration initia-
tives.56  In a mirror image of litigation strategy, Democratic-oriented states
have filed numerous cases in the presumably hospitable forum of the Ninth
Circuit to challenge various iterations of the immigration initiatives of the
Trump administration.
53 A notable exception is Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion in Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2425–29 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring), which discusses the policy concerns
and cites to the scholarship both supporting and attacking the nationwide injunction.  The
majority did not address the issue, as it reversed on the merits the Ninth Circuit decision to
enjoin the Trump administration’s travel ban.  Justice Sotomayor briefly stated in her dis-
sent that a nationwide injunction was appropriate. Id. at 2446 n.13 (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
54 Bray, supra note 1, at 471–72; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 359–63; see also Bruhl,
supra note 6, at 511–14 (criticizing on similar grounds courts’ decisions that a nationwide
injunction can be premised upon only one state, among a group of plaintiff states, satisfy-
ing the standing requirements).
55 Bray, supra note 1, at 457–61; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 363–64.  While ubiqui-
tous in a large country with multiple fora in which to sue, nonetheless forum shopping
undermines rule-of-law values by implying that different judges are being selected by liti-
gants because their decisions are predictable.  Bray, supra note 1, at 457–61.
56 For further discussion of recent forum and judge shopping in suits brought by
states, see Adam Liptak, Texas’ One-Stop Shopping for Judge in Health Care Case, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/24/us/politics/texas-judge-obama-
care.html, where Liptak discusses Alex Botoman, Note, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 297 (2018).
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Other asserted institutional flaws of nationwide injunctions have been
advanced by critics.  These include that such injunctions lead to a lack of
percolation of important legal issues.  The percolation model assumes that
the Supreme Court is best served by having the benefit of the views of several
lower federal courts when the Court addresses a difficult issue.57  The grant-
ing of a nationwide injunction potentially cuts off percolation, since by its
very nature, the government may seek an immediate resolution in the U.S.
court of appeals and the Supreme Court itself.58  Still other problems are
that the widespread use of the injunction increases the risk of conflicting
rulings on requests for national injunctions,59 and that it typically bypasses
the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), which outlines
criteria for an injunction to be issued on behalf of a class.60
Supporters of the nationwide injunction have responded.  On the consti-
tutional objection, they argue that it is a well-settled maxim of equity jurispru-
dence that a court is permitted to grant complete relief to a plaintiff.  When a
federal program is under challenge, it may require the court to enjoin the
activities of the government beyond the geographic boundaries of the court’s
jurisdiction.61  Thus, in the abovementioned cases, Texas in the DAPA litiga-
tion could be adversely affected if the DAPA program were only enjoined in
that state; DAPA beneficiaries in other states could make their way to Texas.
Likewise, in the litigation against the travel ban, Hawaii could be affected by
the limitation on immigrants elsewhere in the United States.  Also, the objec-
tion based on asserted lack of standing is in tension with the entire notion of
a class action.  In a certified class action, the named plaintiff by definition
represents nonparties to the suit, namely, the members of the class.62
Supporters of nationwide injunctions also counter the institutional criti-
cisms of the device.  They contend, among other things, that in certain types
of cases such as those involving immigration or the environment, it will be
almost impossible to grant complete relief to a particular or small group of
plaintiffs where the effect of the federal program crosses state lines.63  Put
another way, it may be practically impossible for the administrators of a fed-
57 Michael E. Solimine, The Fall and Rise of Specialized Federal Constitutional Courts, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 145–47 (2014) (discussing pros and cons of percolation).
58 Bray, supra note 1, at 461–62.
59 Id. at 462–64.
60 Id. at 464–65; Wasserman, supra note 1, at 366–68.
61 See Frost, supra note 1, at 1081–84.
62 Id. at 1084–86.  One prominent supporter, Professor Amanda Frost, points out that
the different conceptions of how the national injunction relates to standing can be seen as
a function of different dispute-resolution and law-declaration models of the federal judicial
process.  As Frost observes, critics of the national injunction tend to follow the former
model, while supporters would typically follow the latter. Id. at 1087–88.  The canonical
discussion of these models, cited by Frost, id. at 1087 n.103, points out that they are not
hermetically sealed from each other, and that the Supreme Court has incorporated ele-
ments of both in its jurisprudence, while emphasizing different elements of the models in
different eras. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 7, at 75.
63 Frost, supra note 1, at 1090–94.
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eral program to conduct the program differently in different parts of the
country.64  To the extent such injunctions encourage forum shopping, they
argue that it is simply an inevitable aspect of a federal government that has
different, geographically bound courts in different parts of the federation.65
What is to be done with the national injunction?  For some critics, the
answer is easy.  All injunctions should only bind the parties to the suit, a
bright-line rule that would have the practical effect of forbidding virtually all
such injunctions.66  A variation of this approach would be to follow a rebutta-
ble presumption against such injunctions, but allow them under some nar-
row circumstances, where class actions or other nonnational remedies are
not appropriate.67  For some supporters, a more hospitable judicial attitude
is appropriate, and that attitude needs no change and indeed should be
adopted as the status quo.68  This would seem to be almost a presumption in
favor of the injunction.  A nuanced version of that approach would acknowl-
edge some of the criticisms of the injunction,69 but deal with them by insist-
ing that district judges attend closely to the pros and cons of such injunctions
on the facts of particular cases.70  Under this suggested approach, a district
judge should determine if “a nationwide injunction [is] essential to provide
the plaintiff with complete relief, protect nonparties from imminent and
irreparable harm, or avoid duplicative litigation and administrative
confusion.”71
Where do we stand on this debate?  If one were to adopt the position
that an injunction should bind only parties to the suit, it would effectively
negate the national injunction (save, perhaps, for the heretofore unusual sit-
uation of all fifty states being parties to the suit).  The near mirror image of
that conclusion is that such injunctions are almost always necessary (with per-
haps rare exceptions) in suits against the federal government.  Either posi-
tion would largely moot out the remainder of this Essay, since those solutions
64 Id. at 1098–101.
65 See Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 57 (2017).
66 Bray, supra note 1, at 469.  One of the bills introduced in Congress in 2018 would
implement this rule. See Injunctive Authority Clarification Act, H.R. 6730, 115th Cong.
(2018); see also sources cited supra note 3.  Similarly, Justice Thomas has argued that such
injunctions “are beginning to take a toll on the federal court system—preventing legal
questions from percolating through the federal courts, encouraging forum shopping, and
making every case a national emergency for the courts and for the Executive Branch.”
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (Thomas, J., concurring).  He further expressed
“skeptic[ism] that district courts have the authority to enter universal injunctions,” based
on the “historical limits on equity and judicial power.” Id. at 2425, 2429.
67 Wasserman, supra note 1, at 386.
68 See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 65, at 58.
69 Frost, supra note 1, at 1104–15.
70 Id. at 1115–18.
71 Id. at 1116; see also Matthew Erickson, Note, Who, What, and Where: A Case for a
Multifactor Balancing Test as a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
331 (2018) (proposing a balancing test focusing on the parties before the court, the nature
of the claim being litigated, and the effect of the remedy on the forum court).
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would usually make it unnecessary to consider how the characteristics of the
one or more states bringing suit should inform the granting of such relief.
Instead, we argue that some national injunctions may be appropriate.
Our conclusion is drawn from our analysis in Part I.  There, we argued that
parens patriae actions by states, at least in some circumstances, were consistent
with the constitutional design and precedent.  We further concluded that
suits by states against the federal government were appropriate to protect
state interests, i.e., to prevent significant economic or physical injury to state
citizens, and served as a check against federal and particular executive over-
reach.  A corollary of these principles, we submit, is that states can act in
concert, and that effective action by states in this regard at least contemplates
national injunctions.  What Part I didn’t address is when a national injunc-
tion is appropriate in light of the concerns raised by Part II.  It is to that issue
that we next turn.
III. STATES SEEKING NATIONAL INJUNCTIONS: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
In Part I we addressed the parens patriae standing of states that sue the
federal government in federal court, and concluded that courts should per-
mit such standing, relax the usual standing requirements, but nonetheless
require that states have some injury to proceed (to deter the inappropriate
filing of such suits).72  In Part II we critically examined the rise in the grant-
ing of national injunctions in suits against the federal government, and con-
cluded that the concerns raised by critics suggested that courts reviewing
such injunctions should only grant them in limited circumstances.73
In this Part we combine these two lines of analysis.  As we previously
observed,74 there is now an abundant literature on the issues raised in Parts I
and II, but very little of it expressly considers whether and to what extent the
characteristics of a state or states claiming standing to sue the federal govern-
ment, and requesting a national injunction, should inform the grant or
denial of such injunctions.75  We undertake that task below.
72 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
73 We do not address considerations that may be appropriate if private parties, or
political subdivisions, request national injunctions.
74 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
75 Most scholars who have contributed to each topic have not contributed to both.  An
exception is Frost, supra note 1, at 1076 n.54, who points out that she had earlier argued
that “Texas’s claimed injury in [the Texas v. United States litigation] did not constitute a
cognizable injury for the purposes of establishing standing.” Id. (citing Amanda Frost &
Stephen I. Vladeck, Limit State Access to Federal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/22/opinion/limit-state-access-to-federal-court.html). The ci-
ted op-ed seems to sweep more broadly than Frost’s summary, arguing that “litigation is
not an alternative to the political process,” and that it “is not difficult to imagine a future in
which any and all executive branch decisions would first be brought before a federal court
by whichever state attorneys general object to that policy.”  Frost & Vladeck, supra.  This
suggests a broader opposition to the notion of states having parens patriae standing in fed-
eral court, at least to challenge federal programs.  Frost did not mention nationwide
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A. Political and Litigation Activism of States
It is difficult to exaggerate the increased regulatory and litigation activity
of most states, led mostly by state attorneys general,76 alone and in concert,
in the last three decades.  The increased activity can be traced to a variety of
factors, including filling the perceived gap left by deregulation during the
Reagan administration; the increased staffing and resources available to state
attorneys general; the greater coordination of attorneys general from differ-
ent states, in part facilitated by the National Association of Attorneys General;
and the higher political profile of the office of attorney general in many
states.77  This has led to a variety of initiatives, including the settlement by
the tobacco companies with almost all of the states in 1998, and the frequent
joint filing of amicus curiae briefs in the Supreme Court by states—to men-
tion only two examples.78  Such initiatives have continued unabated since
then.79
For purposes of this Essay, the most relevant activity by states has been
their filing of suits, frequently together, in federal court challenging the
legality of a variety of actions by the federal government.  Parts I and II of this
Essay have already described some of this “high profile public-law litiga-
tion”80 by states, especially during the Obama and Trump administrations.
These suits are not a recent phenomenon, but they have markedly increased
in the past several years.  Between 1980 and 2010, there were only a handful
of such suits filed yearly.  Since 2010 the number has increased, and since
2014 the yearly number has shot up, to over thirty in 2016.81
The increased litigation by states has also been characterized by their
political polarization.  This is no doubt traceable to the apparent increased
polarization of much of political life in the United States.82  Thus, states asso-
ciated with Republicans (i.e., states led by GOP attorneys general or gover-
nors) almost exclusively sued the Obama administration in federal court,
injunctions in her earlier article, and in her later article does not explicitly address how
state standing may inform the grant or denial of such injunctions.
76 For the most part we treat states and state attorneys general interchangeably, since
the latter represent the former in most situations.  But not all do, and sometimes another
state official, especially a governor, may represent a state, and even where that is not true,
governors and attorneys general can be at odds regarding the position of a state.  We fur-
ther address this point infra Sections III.B–C.
77 See generally PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL (2015).
78 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 65–74; Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective
Action, and the Development of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 357–70 (2012).
79 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 73–74.
80 Id. at 45.
81 Paul Nolette & Colin Provost, Change and Continuity in the Role of State Attorneys Gen-
eral in the Obama and Trump Administrations, 48 PUBLIUS 469, 473–74 (2018) (providing data
on suits brought by states from 1980 to 2016).
82 Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 609–14 (2018) (discuss-
ing coordinated activities and fundraising of the Republican Attorneys General Association
and the Democratic Attorneys General Association); Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at
85–95 (discussing increasing partisan activity of state attorneys general).
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while the reverse has been true during the Trump administration.83  Many of
these suits sought a national injunction against enforcement of a federal pro-
gram.  Consider, as high-profile examples, litigation already discussed in this
Essay.  In Texas v. United States,84 twenty-six GOP States sued the Democratic
Obama administration to overturn the DAPA initiative.  Fifteen States, all
Democratic, plus the District of Columbia, filed an amicus curiae brief in the
Supreme Court supporting DAPA.85  (Also, no fewer than ten GOP gover-
nors of other States eventually appeared as parties or amici in the case on the
side of the plaintiffs.)86  In contrast, in Trump v. Hawaii,87 one Democratic
State sued to overturn the travel ban of the Republican Trump administra-
tion.  By amicus curiae briefs filed in the Supreme Court, sixteen Democratic
States and the District of Columbia supported the suit,88 while an equal num-
ber of GOP States supported the government.89
B. The Benefits and Costs of States Suing the Federal Government
A proximate cause of the increased litigation by states as plaintiffs in
federal court can be directly traced to the standing issue, and in particular
the holding in Massachusetts v. EPA.90  While state standing was not impossi-
ble before that decision and it did not establish a bright-line rule that states
always have standing to sue the federal government, it clarified that states
could, in some circumstances, bring such suits.  Indeed, as we discussed in
Part I, it apparently diluted the usual standing requirements for states,
though the scope of the holding remains unclear.  In any event, the decision,
in conjunction with other factors we addressed above, no doubt facilitated
and encouraged states to bring suit.91
Has the increased appearance by states as plaintiffs, suing the federal
government, been a benefit or detriment to our political and legal institu-
tions?  Several arguments have been advanced in favor of this more activist
role by states.  First, and most fundamentally, states are independent (albeit
subordinate) sovereigns in our federal system.  When states, individually or
collectively, conclude that Congress or the President or both have unlawfully
and adversely affected state laws, interests, or policy choices in a preemptive
83 See Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 84–85 (discussing examples); Lemos &
Young, supra note 6, at 74–85 (same).
84 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct.
2271 (2016).
85 Bruhl, supra note 6, at 512.
86 Nolette, supra note 6, at 352–53.
87 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018).
88 See generally Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).
89 See generally Brief for the States of Texas et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petition-
ers, Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (No. 17-965).  Fourteen of the states appeared
through their attorneys general, while two others were represented by their governors. Id.
at 1.
90 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
91 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 71; Nolette, supra note 6, at 371.
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manner, it is an appropriate check for a state to resist that change in federal
court.  States, in short, have interests in our federal constitutional order, and
can use appropriate political and judicial tools to protect those interests.92
States are also appropriate actors to bring such suits, and have advan-
tages over private actors who purport to represent state interests.  State attor-
neys general (almost all independently elected93) or governors who
represent states as parties or amici in suits don’t operate in a vacuum.  They
are elected officials responsible to and presumably representative of the state
polity, or a considerable portion of it.  They typically have greater resources
and can represent a broader array of interests as compared to a private party
or interest group.94  Attorneys general can accentuate their leverage by join-
ing with their counterparts in other states.95  As with any other of their offi-
cial actions, they need to balance the time and resources devoted to court
action with that demanded from their other duties.  Thus, of necessity, it is
likely to be a more deliberative action by a state than a suit by an individual
private plaintiff.  By the same token, a state suit (or appearance as amicus) is
a real-time signal to a court of the concerns of high-profile elected represent-
atives of the state.96
States suing can also be described as the “litigation safeguards of federal-
ism.”97  The term is a nod toward the well-known “political safeguards of fed-
eralism” theory, which posited that state interests were adequately
represented by members of Congress elected from individual states, so judi-
cial enforcement of federalism limits on the national government was inap-
propriate.98  That safeguards theory has not fared well in practice or in the
literature, since it appears members of Congress make policy for many rea-
sons, but consistent and principled protection of state interests is far down
the list.  That is, members of Congress may pass laws (or not) based on politi-
cal considerations, what they consider to be good policy, or any number of
reasons, but not necessarily to limit the powers of the federal government, or
to protect the states’ federalism interests.99  In contrast, litigation activity is a
92 Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 94–96; Mank, State Standing in United States v.
Texas, supra note 14, at 230.
93 Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083, 1101
(2018) (noting that as of 2017, “[f]orty-four states separately elected their attorney
general”).
94 See Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing, supra note 14, at 1781.
95 Id. at 1782.  Such collective efforts can lead to a broader and presumably more
effective judgment or settlement in the case. See id.  That doesn’t necessarily mean that a
nationwide injunction is always appropriate, as we endeavor to demonstrate in the balance
of this Essay.
96 The points made in this paragraph are discussed in Hessick & Marshall, supra note
22, at 96–97; Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 113; Solimine, supra note 78, at 376–79.
97 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 117; see also Daniel Francis, Litigation as a Political
Safeguard of Federalism, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1023 (2017).
98 Francis, supra note 97, at 1024, 1036–38.
99 For discussion of the political safeguards theory and its many critics, see Lemos &
Young, supra note 6, at 117–118; Solimine, supra note 78, at 374–76, 381–83.
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public activity where one or more states must present transparent and osten-
sibly neutral (i.e., law-based) reasons for advancing state interests, as tested in
an adversarial proceeding.100  Litigation might then compare favorably with
the highly uncertain fate of federalism interests in Congress or the executive
branch.101
These are powerful arguments, and indeed they inform our support of
states being able to sue in federal court, and to be able to be granted a
national injunction, at least within some circumstances.  Nonetheless, signifi-
cant problems attend the embrace of states suing the federal government.
State attorneys general, to state the obvious, are elected politicians as well.
They, too, may file suits on behalf of their states for any number of reasons,
not necessarily for federalism interests regarding their states.  They may file
suit (or not) in whole or in part to appeal to voters, enhance their own
reelection chances, contribute to their plans for other and higher elective
offices, raise money, or for other political reasons, broadly described.102  A
corollary of this point is the increasing partisanship of states suing, especially
in a collective manner.  There is abundant evidence that in recent years, liti-
gation activity (both filing suit and filing amicus briefs) by state attorneys
general is more polarized and less bipartisan than before.103  Due to the
work of entrepreneurial (and ambitious) attorneys general, a general desire
to work with other state officials of the same party, and a general bandwagon
effect, states are increasingly prone to sue together.104
Another reason to be cautious about embracing a state bringing suit as
truly representative of that state’s interests is concerns about which state offi-
cial is filing the suit.  Typically the state attorney general is authorized to
bring the suit, but that officer may be at odds, by virtue of being from differ-
ent political parties or otherwise, with the governor or the state legislature,
who are opposed to the suit (or conversely wish a suit to be brought or an
100 Francis, supra note 97, at 1040–47.
101 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 117–19.
102 Grove, supra note 24, at 895–99; Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 99–100;
Solimine, supra note 78, at 384–85.  This is not to say that, in a representative democracy, it
is illegitimate for an elected state official to take these “political” considerations into
account when bringing suit.  But it does suggest that “states may not have such a . . . pris-
tine role” in suing to check the national government, and that “even if states are granted
standing, the credibility and gravitas of their claims may be diminished.”  Hessick & Mar-
shall, supra note 22, at 100.  Hessick and Marshall are not addressing national injunctions,
but as we argue below, their concerns transfer to that arena as well. See infra Section III.C.
103 See Shane A. Gleason, The Dynamics of Legal Networks: State Attorney General Amicus
Brief Coalition Formation, 39 JUST. SYS. J. 253 (2018); Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 86–92.
Some caution should be noted when making sweeping generalizations about the political
polarization of state litigation activity, by ourselves, and others.  For example, there is more
bipartisanship among state attorneys general, both in filing suits and in joining together on
amicus briefs, with regard to state suits against business interests, as opposed to those
against the federal government.  Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 94–95; see also Nolette,
supra note 6, at 364–70 (discussing regulatory areas where state attorneys general cooper-
ated in a bipartisan way with the Obama administration).
104 See Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 73–74; Solimine, supra note 78, at 387.
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amicus curiae brief filed, when the attorney general does not).105  It is not
unheard of for the attorney general to file suit or an amicus brief even
though not supported by the governor or state legislature, or vice versa.106
While the attorney general rather than the governor may be vested with
authority, as a matter of state law, to bring suit on behalf of the state, it is not
immediately obvious that any given attorney general is a better representative
of the state polity than, say, the governor.  While, again, most attorneys gen-
eral are separately elected, the electorate may or may not have given weight
to the past or anticipated litigative activities of that official when casting a
vote.  (The same can be said for the governor as litigator, of course.)  On the
whole, the legislature may be a more representative and deliberative body
when it comes to speaking for the entire state polity.107
Finally, just as we observed that members of Congress may not be partic-
ularly faithful guardians of federalism in that body, the same can be said of
litigation by state attorneys general.  When states, or a group of states, sue to
set aside some federal program, it may be against the wishes of another group
of states that are in favor of the federal program.  Simply put, not all states
may agree on the propriety of a federal program, and states that successfully
sue are “trying to make policy for the whole country.”108  It is one thing for a
particular state to sue to stop implementation of a federal initiative for that
state.  It is another thing when there is a horizontal conflict among the states
on the propriety of a federal law, and one or more states sue to set aside the
federal law on its face.  If successful, that suit sets a regulatory regime for the
entire country.109  This undermines traditional values of federalism, such as
states serving as laboratories of federalism and promoting interstate
competition.110
105 See Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 100–01; Solimine, supra note 78, at 384–85.
106 See, e.g., Solimine, supra note 78, at 384–85 (discussing the divergent activity in some
states between the attorney general and the governor in the litigation challenging the con-
stitutionality of the Affordable Care Act in the Obama administration).
107 For further discussion, see Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 114–15; Solimine, supra
note 78, at 384–85.  The potential divergence in this regard between the attorney general,
governor, and legislature of a state was highlighted in bills passed by the lame-duck ses-
sions of the GOP majority legislatures of Wisconsin and Michigan following the 2018
midterm elections, when Democrats were elected to the former positions.  The new laws
placed limits on the powers of the new attorneys general to bring suit or abandon present
suits on behalf of the state.  Astead W. Herdon, Michigan Republicans Follow in Contentious
Footsteps, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2018, at A19.  In Wisconsin, the changes were reportedly moti-
vated in part by the desire of the legislature to prevent the newly elected Democratic attor-
ney general from withdrawing from continuing litigation against the Affordable Care Act.
Mitch Smith & Monica Davey, Wisconsin Governor Signs Bill Stifling Democrat Who Beat Him,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2018, at A1.
108 Lemos & Young, supra note 6, at 96.
109 Id. at 95–105; Solimine, supra note 78, at 385–89.
110 Solimine, supra note 78, at 385.
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C. Judicial Limits on States Suing for National Injunctions
National injunctions cannot and should not be evaluated in a vacuum.
Most recently, such injunctions have been sought by states (alone or in com-
bination) suing the federal government.  As we indicated above,111 a growing
literature has suggested judicial limitations on the routine granting of such
injunctions.  We have added to that discussion by considering the benefits
and costs of litigation by states to enforce federalism interests.  In light of
these factors, we now suggest criteria for courts to consider when states
request national injunctions.112  We draw on the litigation activity of states
themselves, as litigants and amici, in particular cases as a proxy to measure
and balance these competing interests.  This fits well with the functional con-
cerns raised by the separate critiques of the appropriateness of state standing
and of national injunctions.113
Put another way, we argue that we should harness the recent increased
litigation activity of states in federal court.  That litigation can be usefully
examined by courts as informational signals in deciding when a nationwide
injunction is appropriate.  If a relatively large number of states, as parties or
amici, support the issuance of such an injunction, then an injunction apply-
ing to all states becomes less objectionable.  The reverse is true if a relatively
large number of states, as parties or amici, oppose a nationwide injunction.
In short, the fact of state participation, as party or amici, and the arguments
and information they present, can be a rich and nuanced database for courts
to consider.114  The benefits increase as the number of participating states
increases.
111 See supra Section II.B.
112 These are not necessarily exclusive of other criteria courts should consider when
deciding whether to grant a national injunction.
113 Courts count states in analogous contexts, that is, in deciding whether to impose
nationwide uniformity as a matter of constitutional law.  For example, the Supreme Court
considers the landscape of state law when deciding whether punishments are cruel and
unusual under the Eighth Amendment. E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579–81
(2005).  The Court also gives interpretative weight to the number of states that file or join
in amicus curiae briefs in support of a particular position. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010).  Another particularly relevant example is South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).  There the Court considered a constitutional challenge by
one State to the preclearance provisions of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.  The
Court effectively considered it a request for a nationwide injunction, as it recognized “that
the questions presented were of urgent concern to the entire country,” and invited all
states to participate as amici curiae. Id. at 307.  Twenty-six States accepted the invitation,
with five backing the challenge while the rest supported the law. Id. at 307 n.2.  The Court
has not repeated the exercise, see Solimine, supra note 78, at 380 n.114, but perhaps it (or
any lower federal court) should consider doing so when faced with requests for national
injunctions.
114 See Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805,
1867–78 (2018) (arguing federal courts should pay deference to amicus curiae participa-
tion by states in federal court cases involving procedural and jurisdictional issues that
impact states).
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One factor should be the precise nature of how states satisfy standing.
Even under apparently relaxed standing requirements as compared to pri-
vate parties, states must still satisfy the familiar factors of injury, standing, and
redressability.115  And the strength of the showing may vary from case to case.
It may also vary from state to state in those cases where more than one state is
collectively suing.  Relaxed or not, states must show some significant interest
or effect upon their polities, even if it may not be as concrete as that
demanded of private plaintiffs.  To be sure, some cases may be pushing (if
not necessarily crossing) the boundaries of such a requirement.  Some schol-
ars have contended that Texas v. United States (where the injury was the issu-
ance of driver’s licenses to DAPA recipients) may be one such case,116 but
one of us has argued that the economic impact of subsidizing driver’s
licenses for Texas was significant enough to merit standing.117  That said,
when courts consider the strong medicine of a national injunction that
affects all states, it should consider the depth of injury to the state (or states)
requesting that relief.118  The stronger the nature of the injury, in one or
among several states, the better case there is for a national injunction.119
Another set of factors can be drawn from the characteristics of the state
or states bringing suit.  One would be the size of the coalition bringing suit.
There is a more justifiable case to be made for a national injunction, setting
national policy for all states, if a significant number of geographically dis-
persed states request such relief.120  A larger number of states will ameliorate
115 See supra Part I.
116 Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 105–06, 108 (suggesting that the Fifth Circuit
in Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015), applied a relaxed approach to state
standing that would not have met normal standing requirements).
117 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 151–62; Mank, State Standing in United States v.
Texas, supra note 14, at 227 (defending result in Texas but cautioning that state standing
should not be based on “relatively trivial issues”).
118 Illustrating the flexible nature of the factors we propose, we would not necessarily
argue that states requesting national injunctions need to assert, say, proprietary interests,
or specific statutory authorization, see infra Section III.D, as opposed to parens patriae inter-
ests.  For example, if many states could demonstrate parens patriae standing based upon
rises in sea level due to climate change, it might justify a national injunction if enough
states were affected on the East and West Coasts, and the Gulf of Mexico.
119 In making this argument, we do not need to take a position on the “one plaintiff is
enough rule,” which holds that as long as one plaintiff among several has standing, the
case may proceed and affect all of the parties. See Bruhl, supra note 6.  The court in Texas
(like most courts) followed this rule, making it only necessary to determine that Texas,
among the twenty-six States suing, had standing. Id. at 512–13.  Even if that is the correct
rule, we argue that courts should take into account the actual injury of each state that has
joined as a plaintiff, as one factor to weigh in deciding whether to grant a national
injunction.
120 Cf. Johnstone, supra note 82, at 620–21 (arguing that the Supreme Court should
give interpretative weight to state amicus curiae briefs submitted by a majority, or perhaps
supermajority of states); Solimine, supra note 78, at 393 (same).  While we do not advocate
a bright-line rule on the number, it could be informed by the requirement of the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) that at least thirty-six attorneys general sign on
to a letter before it becomes official policy of the NAAG. See Policy, NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS
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concerns about horizontal overreaching by one state or a small number of
states, and make it more likely that states with diverse interests are joining
together.  There are various ways a court could gauge the size and scope of a
coalition.  One could consider sheer numbers, the populations of the states
involved, how each one or more claims to have standing, and perhaps other
metrics.121  The heterogeneity of states supporting a national injunction,
measured by ideology or in other ways, enhances the credibility of the argu-
ments advanced by the coalition.122
By the same token, courts should consider how many and what kind of
states are opposing the request for a national injunction.123  Typically this
would be done in the litigation itself, by states filing amicus briefs or seeking
intervention as a party.124  This, too, should inform, in a presumably useful
adversarial way, the scope of coverage of any granted injunction.  A possibly
related factor would be the issue of which public official claims to represent
the state.125  In most states, the attorney general is the authorized official to
bring suit or file an amicus brief.  But whatever state is involved, another state
official (e.g., the governor) may seek to participate and articulate a possibly
different position by that state.  We suggest that a court consider such differ-
ent positions as well, since such dissonant voices would suggest that the state
interest is not clear.
Still another related factor could be indicia of partisanship.126  Courts
could consider the political background of the state officials bringing, or
GEN., https://www.naag.org/naag/policy.php (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).  We thank Paul
Nolette for bringing this to our attention.
121 Cf. Solimine, supra note 78, at 392–93 (discussing similar factors regarding the
weight to be given amicus briefs filed by many states).
122 See Greg Goelzhauser & Nicole Vouvalis, Amicus Coalition Heterogeneity and Signaling
Credibility in Supreme Court Agenda Setting, 45 PUBLIUS 99, 100–02 (2014).
123 See Bruhl, supra note 6, at 512–13 (complaining that the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Texas v. United States ignored the fact that sixteen States appeared as amici to oppose the
suit by twenty-six States).
124 E.g., Texas v. United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579, 591 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (pointing
out that, in litigation challenging constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act after 2017
statutory amendments removing the individual mandate, nineteen States and the governor
of another were plaintiffs, while sixteen States and the District of Columbia intervened as
defendants), aff’d per curiam by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
125 Cf. Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 109 (arguing that courts should only per-
mit state standing “upon a proper showing that the state officer or entity bringing the suit
is the single correct party to maintain the action in the federal court”).  A corollary of this
point is that courts could also consider how, if at all, state attorneys general change their
positions in cases after a new state attorney general is elected. See David Schultz, Blue Wave
Roils Environmental Lawsuits as States Turn to Courts, BLOOMBERG ENV’T (Jan. 8, 2019),
https://news.bloombergenvironment.com/environment-and-energy/blue-wave-roils-envi-
ronmental-lawsuits-as-states-turn-to-courts.
126 Cf. Hessick & Marshall, supra note 22, at 108 (arguing that courts should “demand
some indicia of bipartisanship as a prudential matter before relaxing the injury in fact
requirement for states”); Johnstone, supra note 82, at 616, 620–21 (citing Michael E.
Solimine, Essay, Retooling the Amicus Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 166 n.86 (2016))
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opposing, the suit.  The larger and more bipartisan the coalition bringing
suit, the more confident a court can be that a suit (and a concomitant
request for a national injunction) has not been submitted purely for political
(and forum-shopping) reasons.  This factor has the admirable purpose of
responding to the reality of highly partisan suits by states, and the perception
of politicized decisionmaking by courts in those suits.  Nonetheless, like the
other factors we outline, it should be considered with caution.  How to mea-
sure partisanship in this context is not without problems.  A state attorney
general may be from one party, and most of the other major state elected
officials may be from the other.  And, of course, there are different brands of
Democrats and Republicans (not to mention independents and members of
other political parties), and different shades of blue and red states (to use
modern parlance).  Nonetheless, while referring to federal judges as associ-
ated with the party of the appointing President is a common (if controver-
sial) tactic,127 using the GOP-Democratic divide to categorize nonjudicial
state actors is a familiar step in American civic discourse, and can be used
here.128
We suggest that courts consider these factors as a series of soft presump-
tions rather than bright-line rules.  Granted, if we fashioned them as the lat-
ter, say, always requiring that a supermajority of states be suing as a
prerequisite for a national injunction, it would be easier for courts to apply.
But ease of application is not the goal.  Injunctive relief by its origin and
nature requires a balancing of equitable factors, and we suggest that courts
consider the factors we outline when deciding whether to enter such an
injunction.
To illustrate how these factors could apply, we return to the two deci-
sions we’ve mentioned throughout this Essay.  In Texas v. United States,
twenty-six States brought suit, but the court held that it need only decide that
the lead plaintiff, Texas, had standing, and the record is not clear on the
standing of the remaining plaintiffs.129  We can say that Texas’s standing was
(arguing that the Court should only give weight to state amicus curiae briefs filed by bipar-
tisan groups of state attorneys general or other state officials).
127 See Adam Liptak, Chief Justice Defends Judicial Independence After Trump Attacks ‘Obama
Judge,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/21/us/politics/
trump-chief-justice-roberts-rebuke.html.  There have long been concerns, inside and
outside the legal community, of the Supreme Court (and lower federal courts) being per-
ceived as overtly politicized, and they have been exacerbated by the recent increased politi-
cal polarization.  For an overview, see Richard L. Hasen, Polarization and the Judiciary, 22
ANN. REV. POL. SCI. (forthcoming 2019).
128 It is worth noting it was used by Roberts, speaking for a unanimous Court, when he
gave weight to amicus curiae briefs filed by, as he explicitly mentioned, bipartisan groups
of governors and state attorneys general.  McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355, 2372
(2016).  We nonetheless acknowledge that a federal court, properly concerned with per-
ceptions of its own alleged partisanship, might find it awkward to explicitly consider and
evaluate the partisan composition of states in this context.
129 The lower courts only decided that Texas had standing and found it unnecessary to
decide whether some or all of the other plaintiffs also had standing.  Texas v. United
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probably strongest among the states involved in the litigation, given its signifi-
cant number of immigrants, the economic impact of the DAPA program on
its driver’s license program, and its contiguous border with Mexico.130  While
the states comprising and supporting the plaintiffs were geographically
diverse, without exception they were all affiliated with the Republican
Party.131  To be sure, the opposing amici states were all affiliated with Demo-
crats, but there is no doubt that bipartisanship was glaringly lacking.  On
balance, application of the factors we propose suggests that a national injunc-
tion was not appropriate.
We think the same conclusion is called for in the travel ban litigation.
That litigation, too, had a strong flavor of partisanship in the membership of
the amici states supporting and opposing Hawaii as the plaintiff.132  But the
argument for state standing of Hawaii, as we see it, was weaker than that of
Texas in the DAPA litigation because Hawaii failed to provide much concrete
evidence that the travel ban had affected or would affect a significant num-
ber of students and faculty at its state universities, even though the Ninth
Circuit found that this argument was sufficient for state standing.133  We
acknowledge that a stronger showing of the impact of the travel ban on visit-
ing faculty and students from the affected countries was made in the separate
Ninth Circuit decision of Washington v. Trump,134 which was not reviewed by
the Supreme Court.  But even in that case, the number of affected faculty
and scholars was relatively small.135  Even if Hawaii’s state standing claims of
injury to its state universities from the travel ban were better documented,
those claims would not justify a nationwide injunction unless a large and
diverse number of other states were experiencing similar harms.  Further-
more, large numbers of ideologically similar states were on both sides of the
suit, and on balance a national injunction was not appropriate.136
D. Congressional Limits on States Suing for National Injunctions
We have previously noted several proposals for limiting the national
injunction through congressional legislation.137  These include forbidding
an injunction from binding any nonparties; requiring that any suit against
States, 809 F.3d 134, 155 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 643
(S.D. Tex. 2015).
130 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 151–62.
131 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
132 See supra notes 88–89 and accompanying text.
133 Hawaii v. Trump, 878 F.3d 662, 682 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam), rev’d, 138 S. Ct.
2392 (2018).
134 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
135 Id. at 1158–61.
136 In evaluating the DAPA and travel ban cases, we are not exclusively relying on the
partisan composition of the states, or even asserting that it is the most important factor.
We can contemplate a court granting a nationwide injunction sought by a group of states,
large in number and diverse in other ways, even if all were affiliated with one political
party.
137 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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the federal government be exclusively filed in one district court, like that for
the District of Columbia; or that such suits be filed before a specially con-
vened three-judge district court.  None of these proposals directly addresses
the issue of state standing.  But they could, and so we also address that possi-
bility.  We discuss all of these proposals in the context of our interrelated
critique of state standing and of the national injunction.
We have already addressed one proposal: a statute that would prevent
injunctions from applying to nonparties, which would effectively adopt Bray’s
proposed bright-line rule.138  Acknowledging in general the costs and bene-
fits of national injunctions, and states suing the federal government, we can-
not categorically rule out the propriety of such injunctions (whether or not
sought by a state as plaintiff).  Our judicial limits proposed in Section III.C
call for an admittedly nuanced inquiry by the court, and thus we do not sup-
port the blunt instrument of statutorily forbidding all national injunctions in
all circumstances.
Another proposal would provide for exclusive jurisdiction in one federal
district court, such as that for the District of Columbia.139  This step would of
course curtail the problem of states and other plaintiffs shopping for a
favorable forum.  It is no accident that the District of Columbia was desig-
nated, as Congress has frequently provided that court to be the exclusive
forum for appeals from federal administrative agencies, and other dis-
putes.140  Notable examples of the latter are the currently defunct
preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,141 and the provision
of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 requiring all consti-
tutional challenges to BCRA to be brought before a specially convened three-
judge district court panel in the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia.142
138 See supra Section II.B.
139 Frost, supra note 1, at 1105 (discussing the Assigning Proper Placement of Executive
Action Lawsuits Act, H.R. 2660, 115th Cong. (2017)); see also Bray, supra note 1, at 452–53
(discussing the option of designating one court to hear such cases).  Another variation on
this theme would be to transfer similar cases from around the country to one federal court,
via the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML), 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012), or for
the JPML to similarly transfer parallel appeals of government agency decisions to one cir-
cuit, via 28 U.S.C. § 2112.
140 See generally Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013).
141 Under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10304 (Supp. V 2018),
certain states, mainly in the Deep South, that were required to preclear changes to their
election laws with the U.S. Department of Justice had the option to file a declaratory judg-
ment action seeking preclearance before a specially convened three-judge district court in
the District of Columbia.  That procedure is currently defunct, given Shelby County v.
Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which invalidated the current version of the coverage formula
in section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10303 (Supp. V 2018), which
designated which states were subject to preclearance.
142 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 403, 116 Stat. 81,
113–14.
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Specialized courts of all kinds are typically created to provide for more
efficient and quality judicial decisionmaking by a group of judges who, by
repetition, are more expert on the subject matter.143  For the federal courts
in the District of Columbia (trial and appellate), there is the added benefit
that the judges there are perceived to be especially highly qualified and
excellent judges within the federal system.  And, not being tied directly to
any state, the federal judges in the District of Columbia are arguably chosen
in a less political manner (i.e., not tied to the political vagaries of a particular
state or their senatorial sponsors, as are most other federal judges), and so
adjudications in the District of Columbia may have a nonpartisan or biparti-
san patina absent in the rest of the country.144  Finally, it might seem particu-
larly appropriate for a federal court in the seat of the national government to
decide if a national injunction is called for, as compared to the decision of a
federal court in a far-flung state.
But placing exclusive jurisdiction of such adjudications in the District of
Columbia carries its own costs.  A major problem with this option is that it
eliminates the possibility of percolation, which ostensibly aids the Supreme
Court in its decisionmaking.145  The hurried appellate litigation often
attendant to a single judge’s issuance of a national injunction would seem-
ingly be no less true for one issued in the District of Columbia.  If, as we
argue, the decision to grant a national injunction requires a careful weighing
of factors, it is not obvious why the judges in the District of Columbia, able
though they undoubtedly are, are better positioned to make such a decision
as compared to federal judges elsewhere in the United States.  Indeed, we
contemplate that judges elsewhere will not be routinely granting national
injunctions, but they will still be considering (rightly so) whether to grant an
injunction for the state where they sit (or perhaps for a political subdivision
thereof).  Under the proposal, then, federal judges in the District of Colum-
bia would be placed in the awkward position of deciding cases focusing on
the particular circumstances of a state, not of the District of Columbia
itself.146  Finally, in recent years, the selection process for federal judges in
the District of Columbia has undergone its own politicization, at least for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, as the D.C. Circuit
has become an incubator of Supreme Court Justices.147  Thus, on balance,
143 See LAWRENCE BAUM, SPECIALIZING THE COURTS 32–34 (2011); Richard L. Revesz,
Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111–14
(1990).
144 Solimine, supra note 57, at 148–49.
145 Id. at 142–48 (discussing the pros and cons of percolation, and whether the Court
actually uses the putative benefits of percolation).
146 This problem is already present, given the statutes providing for exclusive jurisdic-
tion in the District of Columbia to review many agency decisions, and the related venue
provisions, even when the major effect of the challenged action is within a state. Id. at 148
& n.134; Michael E. Solimine, Essay, Rethinking District of Columbia Venue in Voting Rights
Preclearance Actions, 103 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 34–35 (2014).
147 Solimine, supra note 57, at 149.
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we see this proposal as no panacea to resolve the conundrum of national
injunctions.
Another proposal would be to specially convene a three-judge district
court, either in the District of Columbia or simply in the state where proper
venue lies.148  According to its proponent, Fifth Circuit Judge Gregg Costa, a
three-judge court issuing a nationwide injunction “would have greater legiti-
macy than one issued by a single judge” for the simple reason that three
minds are greater than one.149  It could “also reduce the benefits of forum
shopping,” by requiring suits seeking such relief to “be randomly assigned to
one of the regional circuits” for convening of the court.150  Costa also argues
that the “best antidote to forum-shopping would be the mandatory review by
the Supreme Court,” which would expedite the resolution of the litiga-
tion.151  He acknowledges that the proposal would undermine the benefits of
percolation, but points out that there could still be percolation on the merits
of the underlying case, since plaintiffs could still sue around the country
seeking injunctions for one state.152
As Costa observes, the proposal is similar to an “old” solution to similar
problems.  Congress in 1910 created the three-judge district court as a reac-
tion to the perceived problems of single district judges too easily enjoining
state laws during the Progressive Era.  It was thought that a court consisting of
the one district judge before whom the suit was originally filed and two other
judges assigned by the chief judge of the circuit (typically one circuit judge
and one district judge) would give greater legal acumen to such important
cases, would be better accepted by the public (as opposed to the actions of
just one judge), and would resolve cases quickly given the opportunity for a
direct appeal to the Supreme Court.153  In 1937, Congress extended the
Court’s jurisdiction to constitutional challenges to federal statutes, a minor
part of the failed court-packing plan of the same year.  The latter extension
was motivated in part by the many injunctions entered by single district
judges against New Deal legislation.154  Apparently, none of the injunctions
148 Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwide-
injunction-problem/.
149 Id.
150 Id.  He pointed out that a random assignment model is similar to current law that
assigns all suits to one circuit when multiple suits are brought challenging agency action.
Id.; see also supra note 139.
151 Costa, supra note 148.
152 Id.
153 For discussion of the early history of the three-judge district court, see Michael E.
Solimine, Congress, Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L.
REV. 101, 111–18 (2008).
154 See Felix Frankfurter & Adrian S. Fisher, The Business of the Supreme Court at the Octo-
ber Terms, 1935 and 1936, 51 HARV. L. REV. 577, 610–15 (1938); Solimine, supra note 57, at
125, 139.
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issued in the 1930s were nationwide,155 and as best as we can tell, the latter
types of three-judge district courts were subsequently not in the forefront of
issuing nationwide injunctions.156
Costa’s proposal is not without its merits, but ultimately, we do not think
it is a panacea.  Dissatisfaction with both types of three-judge district courts
festered in the 1960s and 1970s among federal judges and by policymakers,
premised on the logistical awkwardness of assembling three judges to try a
case; the burdens of direct appeals on the Supreme Court’s docket; and the
belief that the normal course of litigation was appropriate for challenges to
state or federal statutes, just like all other litigation in federal court.157  These
concerns culminated in Congress abolishing the court in 1976, except for
reapportionment cases, which were perceived to be important enough to
warrant special treatment.158
It is not clear to us that the three-judge district should be revived to deal
with national injunctions.  Some of the concerns that drove the 1976 legisla-
tion would apply to the proposal, namely, the complications of assembling
three judges to try the case, and lack of obvious superiority to the usual pro-
cess of trying and appealing cases.  That would be coupled, as Costa acknowl-
edges, with the lack of percolation of cases.159  And given the breadth of
statutes and actions of various kinds by Congress, the President, and agen-
cies, there would seem to be a target-rich environment for suits against the
federal government, many of which, it would seem, would lead to the conven-
ing of a three-judge court and a resulting direct appeal.  On the other hand,
one could argue that suits against federal initiatives seeking nationwide
injunctive relief are important in their own way, much like reapportionment
actions.  No doubt there is some truth to that analogy.  But we are not con-
vinced that the three-judge district court is even necessary for apportionment
cases,160 and we are similarly not convinced that it should be extended to
cases seeking national injunctions.161
155 Bray, supra note 1, at 434–35.  Nor, as best as we can tell, was there a pattern of such
suits being brought by states in the 1930s.
156 One of the cases pointed out by Bray from the 1960s, starting a trend where a
nationwide injunction was sought, was from a three-judge district court. See id. at 439–40
(discussing the three-judge court in Flast v. Gardner, 267 F. Supp. 351 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), rev’d
sub nom. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968)).  While a national injunction was sought in
that case, the case was resolved solely on the standing of the private-party plaintiffs. Flast,
392 U.S. 83.
157 Solimine, supra note 153, at 134–42 (discussing the criticisms).
158 Id. at 142–48 (discussing the 1976 legislation).
159 Costa argues that percolation could continue in suits before single district courts
where litigants only sought local injunctions, but in light of the experience in the Obama
and Trump administrations, we are not sure plaintiffs (or their attorneys) would restrain
themselves from requesting broader injunctive relief. See generally Costa, supra note 148.
160 Michael E. Solimine, The Three-Judge District Court in Voting Rights Litigation, 30 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 79, 126–28, 131–33 (1996) (making this argument).
161 Solimine, supra note 57, at 152–56, 160 (arguing generally that a three-judge district
court, or some other specialized court, is unnecessary to be created as a forum for constitu-
tional challenges to federal legislation).
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Finally, should federal statutes address the issue of states having standing
to sue in federal court?  As we outlined in Part I, states have long been held
to have parens patriae authority to bring suit in federal court, at least as long
as the state articulates some sovereign interest of that jurisdiction.  But apart
from that authority, many federal statutes authorize enforcement of federal
law by states, typically designating the state attorney general as the agent to
bring suit in federal court.162  The rationale for such provisions is that the
deterrence and compensation goals of a federal law are enhanced when
states, in addition to the federal government itself and private plaintiffs, are
empowered to enforce it in federal court.163  The standing of states in this
context has not proven to be controversial.164  This is probably because the
statutes typically do not authorize a state to enforce federal law with no con-
ditions attached.  While we hesitate to generalize the provisions of a broad
array of different statutes, many of them authorize state enforcement when it
is brought “on behalf of the residents” of a state, “threatened or adversely
affected” by the regulated practice,165 or when it “affects or may affect such
State or its residents.”166  A well-known example, allowing states to enforce
the antitrust laws, indicates that states can sue as parens patriae for “injury
sustained by such natural persons” residing in the state.167  By presenting
evidence of such factors, states presumably would demonstrate that they indi-
vidually have standing in particular cases.
How do these statutes inform the problem of state standing and requests
by states for national injunctions?  Presumably, critics of state standing would
support a statute that simply forbids states qua states to have standing in fed-
eral court, at least requiring states to meet the same Article III standing
requirements of private plaintiffs.168  Conversely, supporters of state stand-
ing, at least under some circumstances, might support legislation broadly
authorizing state standing, perhaps even solely based on parens patriae princi-
ples.169  We adopt neither position, as we argue that the status quo on state
standing essentially gets it right.
162 Margaret H. Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 698, 708
(2011).
163 Id. at 712–13.
164 Id. at 712 n.64.
165 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f)(1) (2012).
166 Id. § 1477.
167 Id. § 15c(a)(1).  Other examples are collected in Lemos, supra note 162, at 708–17.
168 Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 536–38 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting)
(suggesting that state standing was undermined by lack of a specific statute authorizing a
state to bring suit).
169 Whether Congress would have the constitutional authority, consistent with the
standing requirements of Article III articulated by the Supreme Court, to enact a statute of
the latter kind is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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CONCLUSION
We have discussed the intersection of recent, heightened concerns over
two aspects of federal court litigation: whether and to what extent states have
standing to sue to challenge congressional legislation or presidential initia-
tives, and when, if ever, federal courts can issue nationwide injunctions.  We
argue that the phenomena are not hermetically sealed from each other, and
that resolving the former can inform judicial resolution of the latter.  In par-
ticular, in deciding whether to issue national injunctions, federal courts
should take into account not only the asserted basis of the standing of states
challenging federal law, but also such factors as the number of those states,
their geographic and political heterogeneity, and the characteristics of states
who might be opposing such suits.  Taking such factors into account will give
more sound institutional grounding to court decisions to grant or deny
requests for national injunctions.
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